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Michael Fischer

STANLEY CAVELL AND CRITICIZING
THE UNIVERSITY FROM WITHIN

S

tanley Cavell has spoken often of his “lifelong quarrel with the
profession of philosophy” but he has said less about the university
as a whole and its pressures on all academic disciplines, philosophy
included.1 In Cavell’s work, “academic” or “professional” philosophy
takes shape in an institutional context he has not yet fully analyzed. I
want here to extrapolate from Cavell’s work a critical, yet sympathetic,
response to the university that I think is especially needed today, when
the rise of the so-called corporate university is intensifying some of the
professional pressures that Cavell resists.
Cavell’s discomfort with academic philosophy stems in part from what
he regards as its narrowness, specifically, its marginalization of Ludwig
Wittgenstein and other philosophers, not to mention Henry David
Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson, the comedies of remarriage, and
other work that Cavell cares about. In his view, the professional marginalization of these writers partly results from their exemplifying what
can seem to be a vague moral seriousness, even at times a prophetic
urgency, that calls for something akin to conversion rather than issuing
in specific conclusions or reforms. According to Cavell, academic philosophy, by contrast, subsumes moral concerns under ethics, a separate
field in which the “point of conversation is getting the other to agree
to, or to do, something.”2
Although Cavell does not systematically analyze the institutional
pressures on academic philosophy, he does drop some hints. As befitting a subject seeking legitimacy in the university, academic philosophy
has aligned itself with teachable subjects such as science, as opposed
to more elusive pursuits such as painting and creative writing, which
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have been less at home in the university and where the necessity of
university instruction may be less clear and the line between success and
failure harder to draw.3 What can be taught in academic philosophy is
a method of analysis, mastery of which can be certified in students by
professors and in professors by journals, promotion and tenure committees, and administrators. Subdividing philosophy into discrete fields
such as ethics makes it even more manageable, or less susceptible to
sweeping pronouncements that cannot be tested by experts. Finally, the
interest in getting “the other to agree to, or to do, something” associates academic philosophy, or at least ethics, with measurable results and
maybe even progress.
The rise of the so-called corporate university has exacerbated the
emphasis on teachable expertise and definable outcomes that I have been
describing. Take the largest private university in the United States—the
University of Phoenix—as a model that some state and non-profit private universities may be emulating as they struggle to cut costs, meet
external expectations, and work with reduced budgets. At the University
of Phoenix, the interest in measurable results gets recast as learning
outcomes that teachers enable students to reach as efficiently as possible. Specialization narrows these learning outcomes to sharply defined
skills, such as writing business memos, which students can master and
build on. Finally, the emphasis on method does not simply depersonalize instruction; it reduces the need for instructors. Each instructor is
tasked with teaching as many students as possible, sometimes through
distance learning, with class size reaching a limit only when the learning
outcomes cannot be delivered. Lacking tenure, these instructors can be
replaced, like interchangeable parts, when they wear out or their student
customers become too dissatisfied with them. At another rapidly growing for-profit university, DeVry, students unhappy with their instructors
are assured, in the words of a campus dean, that “weak links” will be
“fixed” in a “total quality management” environment.4
Along similar lines, Lindsay Waters has recently explored how “the
corporate makeover of the university” and “the commercialization of
higher education” have affected academic publishing.5 Universities
compete in an increasingly cutthroat marketplace and face an escalating
insistence on results from state legislatures, federal agencies, accrediting
associations, and boards. Capitulating to this “accountability culture”
(EP, p. 20), bottom-line driven administrators have stepped up demands
for faculty productivity, measured in quantitative terms by numbers of
students taught, grants won, and, what most concerns Waters, books and
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articles published. These administrators have “outsourced” tenure and
promotion decisions to journal editors and academic publishers, much
like Ford buying batteries from Delcro (EP, p. 25). In Waters’ polemic,
everyone is implicated in the loss of “any transcendental element” (EP,
p. 11), any element of judgment or imagination, in the corporatist
university: “greedy deans and provosts” (EP, p. 37); undiscriminating
journal and university press editors who abandon standards “to keep
the assembly-line moving” (EP, p. 22); librarians who fail to protect
“book budgets from rapacious commercial presses who gouge them
on journals” (EP, p. 37); and ambitious faculty members, “captains of
academic industry” (EP, p. 67), who pursue star status instead of institutional change and who remain oblivious to the suffering of exploited
adjuncts, like smug corporate CEOs insulated from their less well off
employees (EP, p. 29).
I am not suggesting that academic philosophers are responsible for
these tendencies or would endorse them. My point is that the remaking of universities along corporate lines has exacerbated pressures that
have long impinged on disciplines seeking university legitimacy. Some
of these pressures result from universities being institutions with limited
resources that will always have to set priorities and justify what they do.
There is nothing new or even necessarily objectionable about calls for
accountability, productivity, and efficiency. Universities should be interested in containing costs, assessing the effectiveness of their programs,
and thinking through their choices. What is new and objectionable is
reducing the goals of universities to immediate, quantifiable results.
The question remains, however, what are those of us in universities to
do about these corporatist tendencies besides vent, like Waters, or give
in, like the DeVry dean? For some guidance, I want to return to Cavell’s
dissatisfaction with academic philosophy. Cavell does not categorically
reject academic philosophy. Instead, he recognizes it as “the genuine
present of the impulse and the history of philosophy, so far as that present takes its place in our (English-speaking) public intellectual life” (TS,
p. 32). As a writer, he wants neither to bypass academic philosophers
as an audience nor limit his writing to their models. He admits to a
“career-long wish” for his work “to be answerable to professional philosophy.”6 Cavell’s accountability to professional philosophy has puzzled
some of his readers, among them Richard Rorty, who detect in Cavell
an institutional timidity at odds with the boldness of his preference for
Thoreau and other writers. As Cavell paraphrases Rorty’s concern, “to
go on to worry whether certain of the texts I promote are philosophy
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or are something else (say literature) is unnecessary; or rather, it is
something deans worry about.” Cavell responds,
Would it have helped to add that what I care about in a work is what the
work shows itself to be, to let happen, to care about, and that this is not
something that can be known by how a dean, or anyone else, decides to
classify texts and thereupon to invest in them?7

The works that interest Cavell show themselves to be steeped in philosophical issues (such as skepticism), committed to philosophical goals
(such as liberation from false necessities), and capable of philosophical
rigor in their thinking and writing.8 By calling these works “philosophical,” Cavell is claiming that they reward a deep level of attentiveness
and seriousness in our approach to them. Instead of giving up on academic philosophy, he wants these works to put pressure on it, and for
him that means continuing to call them “philosophical” and persisting
in writing “at once inside the profession of philosophy and outside”
(PDAT, p. 193).
Potentially even more worrisome to a dean, Cavell has long wondered
not just whether the writing that he most values belongs in philosophy
or literature departments but whether it is teachable at all. The limits
of instruction, the inability of teachers to guarantee the effectiveness of
their teaching, is a major moment in all the writers that interest Cavell,
expressed sometimes from the point of view of a student (for example,
Emerson’s remark in his “Divinity School Address” that “truly speaking,
it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from another
soul”)9 and sometimes from the point of a view of a teacher, as in
Wittgenstein’s Investigations #217: “If I have exhausted the justifications
I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to
say: ‘This is simply what I do’” (quoted in CHU, p. 70). In wanting their
work to be taken up and continued voluntarily, in wishing to prevent
understanding which is unaccompanied by profound inner change, in
thus asking so much of their readers, including trust and an openness
to uncertainty, self-doubt, and self-scrutiny, Emerson and Wittgenstein
admit that the effectiveness of their teaching depends on the always
unpredictable consent of their students or readers.10 Although this consent can be provoked, it cannot be forced, taken for granted, or reduced
to routine without violating the autonomy that it depends on. In The
Claim of Reason, after noting the lack of impact made by Wittgenstein
and Austin on academic philosophical culture, Cavell adds, “I do not
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say that this is a bad thing”11—that is, a thing that can be moralized or
easily fixed. Later, in This New Yet Unapproachable America, after making
a similar point about the “insufficient” reception of Wittgenstein by
professional philosophy, Cavell says, “I am not interested in expressing
or assessing blame for this situation, either of those who may neglect
the spiritual fervor [of Wittgenstein] as philosophically impertinent or
of those who may insist on the fervor impertinently” (NYUA, p. 30). It
is an open question for Cavell “whether the soul’s journey is any part of
a university’s business, hence to what extent, if it is an essential part of
philosophy’s business, philosophy is left out of the university,” or should
be (CHU, p. 32). In short, he is not sure “whether any sky remains a
canopy for philosophy” (NYUA, p. 8).
Even as Cavell refuses to demonize academic philosophy or philosophers, he often expresses his gratitude to the universities that he has been
associated with—to the intellectual community he enjoyed at Berkeley,
to teachers like J. L. Austin, to colleagues and students, to the teaching
fellows of a particular course (Cities of Words, a book, he says, “that was
born in a classroom” [CW, p. 163] is dedicated to the teaching fellows
in Moral Reasoning 34). In an early essay on film in the university, he
asks, playfully paraphrasing Marx,
Isn’t a university the place in our culture that enables us now to teach one
thing today and learn another tomorrow, to hunt for time to write in the
morning, fish for a free projector in the afternoon, try to raise money for
projects in the evening, and after a seminar read criticism? To some this
will not seem a Utopian set of activities, but in the meantime, and for
those with a taste for this particular disunity, why not have it?12

As someone who has benefited from being in a university, he speaks
with conflicting emotions of “gifted philosophical sensibilities deflected
from pursuing their love of philosophy by their unwillingness or incapacity to face institutionalized disapproval” (NYUA, p. 6). Although he
empathizes with their isolation, he never romanticizes it. He notes “how
one grows weary of oneself with only oneself for conversation; and one
gets cranky as well as hoarse . . . . But the worst is that isolation causes
uncreativeness and parochialism more often than it makes for anything
better” (PH, p. 273–74). At any rate, despite his ongoing doubts about
whether as a university professor in a philosophy department he is in
the right place, he writes The Claim of Reason as “the record of one who
stayed” (CR, p. xviii).
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I am interested here not in why Cavell has stayed but in what staying
means. For one thing, staying, whether in academic philosophy or the
university, means being fortunate enough to having gotten in. To borrow from Cavell’s analysis of moral perfectionism, having gotten in puts
Cavell among the advantaged in our society—not the most advantaged,
to be sure, but not the least, either. In Cavell’s case, or, I would argue,
in the case of any tenured university professor (i.e., not just one with an
endowed chair at Harvard), “advantaged” means working in an institution that permits a degree of autonomy, security, and critical thinking
rarely found in other American workplaces.
For all their many benefits, however, universities are not perfect, the
remaking of universities along corporate lines being only one example
of ominous tendencies most of us would criticize. It would be easy to
turn Cavell’s dissatisfaction with academic philosophy into a wholesale
indictment of a spineless profession that has curried institutional favor
by excluding what it most ought to value (I can imagine Waters taking this path). It would also be easy to fault Cavell for not making this
indictment—for seeming to set aside his grievances and ignoring the
injustices, omissions, and shortsightedness of the university environment that supports him. From this point of view, Cavell’s decision to
stay, his consent to remaining a member of the academic profession,
compromises him and nullifies the value of his work for those who are
not so privileged or content.
Cavell not only understands the alienation and anger that fuel this
critique; he shares them. One of his most frequently quoted comments
is from Emerson’s “Self-Reliance,” “Every word they say chagrins us and
we know not where to begin to set them right” (quoted in NYUA, p.
69), which speaks of an intellectual isolation so deep that it could lead
to despair and fuel dreams of escape. In Emerson, it does not, partly
because he realizes that some measure of isolation—he calls it “poverty
and solitude”—attends all serious philosophical work, wherever one
undertakes it. Eschewing conformity, the scholar, in Emerson’s words,
“takes the cross of making his own [road]” and with it “the self-accusation,
the faint heart, the frequent uncertainty and loss of time, which are the
nettles and tangling vines in the way of the self-relying and self-directed;
and the state of virtual hostility in which he seems to stand to society,
and especially to educated society.”13 Neither Emerson nor Cavell can
imagine a society or even a relationship where these feelings will once
and for all way give way to acceptance, recognition, and unconditional
support. As Cavell puts it, some measure of misunderstanding and social
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rejection is “a characteristic fate of philosophy, at least in any somewhat
novel form” (CW, p. 163).
Acknowledging the inevitability of rejection and neglect tempers our
search for community and may incline us to concede, however begrudgingly, that the place we inhabit—in this case, the university—is good
enough: maybe not perfect but better than any conceivable alternative,
especially when we take into account, as Cavell does, the costs of more
radical forms of isolation, such as bitterly leaving the academic profession
or sadly not getting in. This acceptance of the university as the best place
we can find (for now) is hardly a ringing endorsement and can lead to
various strategies for adapting to an environment one cannot flee or
change, a place where, in Cavell’s words, our consent “can neither be
given nor withdrawn” (CW, p. 198). These adaptive responses include
silent melancholy, quiet desperation, indifference, cynicism, aloofness,
or adopting what Cavell calls, following Emerson, the “forced false smile
of conformity” (CHU, p. 28), pasted on to survive conversations that
do not interest us and situations where we do not feel at home. All of
these help us survive a world where we feel stuck, invisible, lost, powerless to make ourselves intelligible to others, let alone influence them,
and uncomfortably aware that our privileges may be somehow bound
up with the sufferings of others but not sure where our responsibilities
lie or how we can carry them out.
For Cavell, inheriting the writing of Emerson, Wittgenstein, and
others, going on with it in our own often dark time, means above all
showing us how to withstand moral cynicism, or how to respond to the
inevitable failures of our institutions—universities included—and our
complicity with them, “otherwise than by excuse or withdrawal” (CHU,
p. 18). I think a key move on his part is to shift our attention from
persuading or defeating the scoundrels in our lives, which can seem
futile, to releasing the good in ourselves and in others, as Austin did
for him (Cavell says he owes Austin “whatever is owed the teacher who
shows one a way to do relevantly and fruitfully the thing one had almost
given up hope of doing”).14 As Cavell puts it, “a philosopher will naturally think that the other has to be argued out of his position, which is
apt to seem hopeless. But suppose the issue is not to win an argument
. . . but to manifest for the other another way . . . a shift in direction,
as slight as a degree of the compass, but down the road making all the
difference in the world” (CHU, p. 31). Cavell’s ongoing quarrel with
academic philosophy becomes what Emerson might call an aversive
conversation with what, for all Cavell knows, may be an implacable
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force but a conversation which other individuals may pick up on and
sustain because it represents a shift in direction they also are wishing to
take. By continuing his conversation with academic philosophy without
any guarantee of institutional impact, by exemplifying another way of
doing philosophy, Cavell is acting on the hope that some individuals
somewhere will find in his words their own repressed thoughts returned
to them and be encouraged to continue. The force of his words lies
in their power not to compel agreement but to attract, provoke, or
awaken the interest of individual readers. The individuals touched by
Cavell may still find themselves incomprehensible and isolated in their
immediate institutional surroundings, yet they have found in Cavell’s
writing a reprieve from their disillusionment and the stirrings of a new
kind of intellectual community—not “the overcoming of [their] isolation, but the sharing of that isolation.”15 For these readers, Cavell has
filled the role that moral perfectionism assigns the friend, or someone
“whose conviction in one’s moral intelligibility draws one to discover
it, to find words and deeds in which to express it, in which to enter the
conversation of justice” (CHU, p. xxxii).
Cavell decides to stay rather than withdraw; in choosing to stay, he
accepts his membership in an admittedly flawed institution. With that
membership, however, comes many responsibilities, among them taking an interest in what happens to you and others; being sociable (as
opposed to disengaged); participating; staying open to personal change
and self-criticism; listening; remaining endlessly responsive to difference; engaging in meet and happy conversations with those around
us (adapting Milton, Cavell notes that “a certain happiness, anyway a
certain spirited and orderly participation, is owed to the commonwealth
by those who have sworn allegiance to it” [CHU, p. 105]). In stressing
these responsibilities, Cavell is reaffirming that “I owe to my society a
meet and cheerful exchange to reaffirm my consent, or a else a willingness to articulate the public causes of my unhappiness. That there is
no measurable limit to my responsibility for the way things are, or to
how far the effect of my unhappiness mars the possibility of the general happiness, hence brings into question the fact of our communal
existence” (CW, p. 68)—brings it into question by suggesting that it
leaves someone out. “Meet and cheerful” here mean not “bubbly and
happy”—remember, we have wiped off the fake smile of conformity—but
“spirited,” which in turn means engaging in exchanges rather than diatribes or one-sided attacks, exchanges where we seek to learn as well as
demonstrate something.
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Just as Cavell is not retreating in silent melancholy within or outside
the university, neither is he declaring immediate or even eventual victory.
There is no guarantee that things will get any better: hence the need
for ceaseless responsiveness and “eternal vigilance” (CHU, p. 125). Following Emerson, Cavell is continually counseling patience, persistence,
waiting, resourcefulness, improvisation, hope, in the face of discouraging
odds and the inevitability of disappointment. He is asking us to conduct
our work with “an attitude to our pursuits that is precisely unimposable
and unrewardable” (CHU, p. 10): unimposable, because it cannot be
forced on ourselves or on others but has to come from within each of
us; unrewardable, because it finds fulfillment in every step of the way,
not in some ultimate pay off or triumph that may never materialize.
The uncertainty of success returns me to what I earlier called the
limits of teaching, or those moments when, as Wittgenstein describes
them, justifications come to an end and “my spade is turned.” At these
times, I feel I have done everything, or at least enough, to make myself
clear. Adding to what I have already said is not getting me anywhere—in
advancing my own understanding, in spurring on my apparently stalled
students. It is time now for my students to respond, not just to regurgitate what they have heard but to go on with it, on their own, maybe
in a direction that I cannot anticipate. These are the anxious moments
that the remaking of education along corporate lines seeks to minimize
by limiting instruction to the most manageable tasks and installing
mechanical check points along the way, such as annual standardized
tests in American high schools, which sustain the illusion of lock step
progress from level to level.
Cavell, by contrast, does not evade the unpredictability of teaching but
values it. Again, in the scene of instruction depicted by Wittgenstein, after
I have said everything I can, “Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply
what I do.’” Commentators like Saul Kripke have treated “this is simply
what I do” as resolving the teacher’s dilemma along the lines of saying
to the student, “take it or leave it,” or, as Cavell paraphrases Kripke’s
reading, “after I have done everything to guide you, I am licensed to say,
‘do it my way or suffer the consequences,’” with “licensed” carrying the
full weight of institutional authority. Cavell, however, takes “this is simply
what I do” as something that the teacher is only inclined to say, maybe
in the authoritarian, frustrated tone heard by Kripke but maybe in a
more passive or personal way: a teacher confessing what he or she does
without invoking any institutional authority, admitting to the student “‘I
cannot see here where or how to make myself plainer, but here I am,
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doing what I do, whenever you find you are interested again” (PDAT,
p. 204). Waiting like this, giving the student time, means accepting the
right of others to contest what I say, to teach me. It means “letting my
confidence be challenged, anyway become hesitant in, thoughtful about,
expressing itself” (CHU, p. 76), not assuming or mandating concurrence
but asking myself “how important it is that we agree, and how thoroughly,
in various strains of our form or forms of life, and where we may, or
can, or ought to, or must, tolerate differences, even perhaps be drawn
to change our lives—or suffer the consequences” (PDAT, p. 204).
What some academic philosophers regard as the most annoying features of Cavell’s writing turn out to exemplify the pedagogical values I
have been describing. The confidence “hesitant in, thoughtful about,
expressing itself” informs seemingly endless sentences that circle back
on themselves, qualifying their key points and setting in motion possible
further revision. Acknowledging that “this is simply what I do” amplifies
Cavell’s personal voice in his writing, by which I mean his references
to his own earlier work, his promissory notes to himself on topics that
one day he hopes to pursue, and his careful tracking of where he stands
and how he feels (“I come back to earth,” “I feel like saying,” and so
on). Inviting readers to continue his thinking leads to essays that often
end in open-ended questions or in provisional statements that function
more as gathering places than as final destinations, as if he is not only
summing up what he has said but encouraging further work on the
part of the reader. The overall point of the essay admittedly may seem
vague, though only when measured against calls for specific actions that
Cavell neither precludes nor issues.
I am not suggesting that all teaching and writing must all the time
be this tentative and exploratory. Patience has its limits, as does anger.
Much as we can move too fast, we can wait too long in reaching conclusions, making decisions, and taking a stand. My point is that the scene
of instruction described by Cavell captures a possibility that universities
ought to treasure rather than steamroll away in the name of narrowly
defined efficiency and productivity. The humility represented in this
scene validates the university as place where coercion gives way to consent, judgments can be contested as well as made, and students and
teachers can take their time, exchange places, reconsider where they
are headed, and remain open to change, in themselves and in others.
Staying in the university, continuing to teach and write, despite all
the discouragements that come one’s way, all the problems one feels
somehow responsible for but cannot solve, thus does mean granting
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some legitimacy to the university. It means ratifying universities as places
that remain, if not perfect, at least open to reform, conducive to aversive
conversations, places where “happiness and liberty can be pursued and,
to whatever extent such a thing is possible, preserved” (CW, p. 75). As
Cavell observes, in one of his most explicit statements of support for the
university and the academic freedom it should stand for, “I do not have
to claim that everything is possible in every period in order to plead
this much for universities: that while they may suffer every failing of the
institutions of which they partake, they are unique among institutions
in preserving the thought that nothing is the only game in town, or
that if something is, then there are habitations outside the town where
it is not. For that reason, before any other, they have, as they stand, if
not my devotion, my loyalty” (PH, p. 274). Devotion here would imply
uncritical allegiance; loyalty can, and sometime should, take the form
of loyal opposition.
For some critics, I would imagine that claiming even this much for
the openness of universities is conceding too much or settling for too
little. The unhappiness of these individuals has reached a point where
they feel diminished by continuing to stay or participate. In institutions
like universities that depend so heavily on consent and engagement, it
must always be an open question, subject to collective discussion and
personal judgment, whether the evasions, injustices, and exclusions of
universities have gone so far as to discredit them altogether. I do not
feel that way, at least not now, however much those of us who have
decided to stay must remain open to letting our confidence be tested.
In any case, to paraphrase a comment by Cavell on Wittgenstein, this
much seems to me true: imagine a university without Cavell’s writing
and the voices he has encouraged. It is a place where our danger to
one another grows faster than our help for one another.16
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